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<feed xml:lang="en-us" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title>Simon Willison's Weblog: certificates</title><link href="http://simonwillison.net/" rel="alternate"/><link href="http://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates.atom" rel="self"/><id>http://simonwillison.net/</id><updated>2024-06-11T15:38:15+00:00</updated><author><name>Simon Willison</name></author><entry><title>Private Cloud Compute: A new frontier for AI privacy in the cloud</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2024/Jun/11/private-cloud-compute/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-06-11T15:38:15+00:00</published><updated>2024-06-11T15:38:15+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2024/Jun/11/private-cloud-compute/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://security.apple.com/blog/private-cloud-compute/"&gt;Private Cloud Compute: A new frontier for AI privacy in the cloud&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
Here are the details about Apple's Private Cloud Compute infrastructure, and they are pretty extraordinary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The goal with PCC is to allow Apple to run larger AI models that won't fit on a device, but in a way that guarantees that private data passed from the device to the cloud cannot leak in any way - not even to Apple engineers with SSH access who are debugging an outage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an extremely challenging problem, and their proposed solution includes a wide range of new innovations in private computing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The most impressive part is their approach to technically enforceable guarantees and verifiable transparency. How do you ensure that privacy isn't broken by a future code change? And how can you allow external experts to verify that the software running in your data center is the same software that they have independently audited?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When we launch Private Cloud Compute, we’ll take the extraordinary step of making software images of every production build of PCC publicly available for security research. This promise, too, is an enforceable guarantee: user devices will be willing to send data only to PCC nodes that can cryptographically attest to running publicly listed software.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These code releases will be included in an "append-only and cryptographically tamper-proof transparency log" - similar to &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency"&gt;certificate transparency logs&lt;/a&gt;.


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/apple"&gt;apple&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/ethics"&gt;ethics&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/privacy"&gt;privacy&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/security"&gt;security&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/ai"&gt;ai&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/generative-ai"&gt;generative-ai&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/llms"&gt;llms&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/apple-intelligence"&gt;apple-intelligence&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/ai-ethics"&gt;ai-ethics&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="apple"/><category term="certificates"/><category term="ethics"/><category term="privacy"/><category term="security"/><category term="ai"/><category term="generative-ai"/><category term="llms"/><category term="apple-intelligence"/><category term="ai-ethics"/></entry><entry><title>trustme</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2021/Feb/11/trustme/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2021-02-11T20:00:56+00:00</published><updated>2021-02-11T20:00:56+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2021/Feb/11/trustme/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://github.com/python-trio/trustme"&gt;trustme&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
This looks incredibly useful. Run &lt;code&gt;python -m trustme&lt;/code&gt; and it will create three files for you: &lt;code&gt;server.pem&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;server.key&lt;/code&gt; and a &lt;code&gt;client.pem&lt;/code&gt; client certificate, providing a certificate for "localhost" (or another host you spefict) using a fake certificate authority. Looks like it should be the easiest way to test TLS locally.

    &lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;/small&gt;Via &lt;a href="https://twitter.com/sethmlarson/status/1359898180175953922"&gt;Seth Michael Larson&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/tls"&gt;tls&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="certificates"/><category term="tls"/></entry><entry><title>The case against client certificates</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2020/Dec/9/case-against-client-certificates/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2020-12-09T14:41:46+00:00</published><updated>2020-12-09T14:41:46+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2020/Dec/9/case-against-client-certificates/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://twitter.com/colmmacc/status/1057017343438540801"&gt;The case against client certificates&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
Colm MacCárthaigh provides a passionately argued Twitter thread about client certificates and why they should be avoided. I tried using them as an extra layer of protection fir my personal Dogsheep server and ended up abandoning them—certificate management across my devices was too fiddly.

    &lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;/small&gt;Via &lt;a href="https://fly.io/blog/incoming-6pn-private-networks/"&gt;Thomas Ptacek&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/dogsheep"&gt;dogsheep&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="certificates"/><category term="dogsheep"/></entry><entry><title>How CDNs Generate Certificates</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2020/Jun/26/how-cdns-generate-certificates/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2020-06-26T00:03:45+00:00</published><updated>2020-06-26T00:03:45+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2020/Jun/26/how-cdns-generate-certificates/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://fly.io/blog/how-cdns-generate-certificates/"&gt;How CDNs Generate Certificates&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
Thomas Ptacek (now at Fly) describes in intricate detail the challenges faced by large-scale hosting providers that want to securely issue LetsEncrypt certificates for customer domains. Lots of detail here on the different ACME challenges supported by LetsEncrypt and why the new tls-alpn-01 challenge is the right option for operating at scale.


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/acme"&gt;acme&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/domains"&gt;domains&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/thomas-ptacek"&gt;thomas-ptacek&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/tls"&gt;tls&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/fly"&gt;fly&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="acme"/><category term="certificates"/><category term="domains"/><category term="thomas-ptacek"/><category term="tls"/><category term="fly"/></entry><entry><title>Client-Side Certificate Authentication with nginx</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2019/Oct/5/client-side-certificate-authentication-nginx/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2019-10-05T17:26:35+00:00</published><updated>2019-10-05T17:26:35+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2019/Oct/5/client-side-certificate-authentication-nginx/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://fardog.io/blog/2017/12/30/client-side-certificate-authentication-with-nginx/"&gt;Client-Side Certificate Authentication with nginx&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
I’m intrigued by client-side browser certificates, which allow you to lock down a website such that only browsers with a specific certificate installed can access them. They work on both laptops and mobile phones. I followed the steps in this tutorial and managed to get an nginx instance running which only allows connections from my personal laptop and iPhone.


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/nginx"&gt;nginx&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/security"&gt;security&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/dogsheep"&gt;dogsheep&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="certificates"/><category term="nginx"/><category term="security"/><category term="dogsheep"/></entry><entry><title>Extended Validation Certificates are Dead</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2018/Sep/18/extended-validation-certificates-are-dead/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2018-09-18T13:41:24+00:00</published><updated>2018-09-18T13:41:24+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2018/Sep/18/extended-validation-certificates-are-dead/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.troyhunt.com/extended-validation-certificates-are-dead/"&gt;Extended Validation Certificates are Dead&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
Troy Hunt has been writing about the flaws of Extended Validation certificates for a while. Now iOS 12 is out and Mobile Safari no longer displays their visual indicator in the URL bar (and desktop Safari will stop doing so next week when Mac OS Mojave ships). EV certificates are being dropped by many of the larger companies that were using them. “This turned out to be a long blog post because every time I sat down to write, more and more evidence on the absolute pointlessness of EV presented itself”.


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/security"&gt;security&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/troy-hunt"&gt;troy-hunt&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="certificates"/><category term="security"/><category term="troy-hunt"/></entry><entry><title>The death of a TLD</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2018/Jul/28/death-tld/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2018-07-28T20:07:00+00:00</published><updated>2018-07-28T20:07:00+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2018/Jul/28/death-tld/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/the-death-of-a-tld"&gt;The death of a TLD&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
Sony have terminated their .xperia TLD. Ben Cox used Certificate Transparency logs to evaluate the 11 total TLDs that have been abandoned since the gTLD gold rush started—since HTTPS is becoming the default now these logs of issued certificates are a great indicator of which domains (or TLDs) are being actively used. The only deleted TLD with legitimate looking certificates (apparently for a  mail server) was .mcdonalds


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/dns"&gt;dns&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/domains"&gt;domains&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/tls"&gt;tls&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="certificates"/><category term="dns"/><category term="domains"/><category term="tls"/></entry><entry><title>mkcert</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2018/Jun/26/mkcert/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2018-06-26T18:55:56+00:00</published><updated>2018-06-26T18:55:56+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2018/Jun/26/mkcert/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://github.com/FiloSottile/mkcert"&gt;mkcert&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
Handy new tool from Filippo Valsorda (a cryptographer at Google) for easily generating TLS certificates for your local development environment. You can use this to get a certificate pair for a localhost web server created with a couple of simple commands.

    &lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;&lt;/small&gt;Via &lt;a href="https://twitter.com/FiloSottile/status/1011481876593340417"&gt;@FiloSottile&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/go"&gt;go&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/https"&gt;https&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/filippo-valsorda"&gt;filippo-valsorda&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="certificates"/><category term="go"/><category term="https"/><category term="filippo-valsorda"/></entry><entry><title>Extended Validation is Broken</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2017/Dec/12/extended-validation-is-broken/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2017-12-12T01:36:29+00:00</published><updated>2017-12-12T01:36:29+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2017/Dec/12/extended-validation-is-broken/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://stripe.ian.sh/"&gt;Extended Validation is Broken&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
Ian Carroll spent $100 incorporating a company called “Stripe, Inc” in the state of Kentucky and $77 on an Extended Validation certificate tied to that legal entity. Safari (and Mobile Safari) now hide the URL bar completely, displaying “Stripe, Inc” in its place. “This means the attacker does not even need to register a convincing phishing domain. They can register anything, and Safari will happily cover it with a nice green bar.”


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/phishing"&gt;phishing&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/security"&gt;security&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="certificates"/><category term="phishing"/><category term="security"/></entry><entry><title>prooveme.com</title><link href="https://simonwillison.net/2007/Feb/22/prooveme/#atom-tag" rel="alternate"/><published>2007-02-22T12:01:58+00:00</published><updated>2007-02-22T12:01:58+00:00</updated><id>https://simonwillison.net/2007/Feb/22/prooveme/#atom-tag</id><summary type="html">
    
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://prooveme.com/"&gt;prooveme.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
An OpenID provider that uses SSL client certificates (which you install in your browser) for authentication.


    &lt;p&gt;Tags: &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/certificates"&gt;certificates&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/openid"&gt;openid&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/prooveme"&gt;prooveme&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/ssl"&gt;ssl&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



</summary><category term="certificates"/><category term="openid"/><category term="prooveme"/><category term="ssl"/></entry></feed>